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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper tests for asymmetric information in the U.K. annuity market by trying to identify 
'unused observables,' attributes of individual insurance buyers that are correlated both with subsequent 
claims experience and with insurance demand but that insurance companies historically did not use to set 
insurance prices. Unlike the widely-used positive correlation test for asymmetric information, which 
searches for a positive correlation between insurance demand and risk experience, the unused observables 
test is not confounded by heterogeneity in individual preference parameters that may affect insurance 
demand.  We identify residential location as an unused observable  in the U.K. annuity market of the late 
1990s, and show that this variable  is correlated both with annuity demand and with prospective mortality. 
Thus even though residential location is observed by all market participants, the decision not to condition 
prices on it creates the same types of market inefficiencies that arise when annuity buyers have  private 
information about mortality risk.  Our findings raise interesting questions about how insurance companies 
select the set of buyer attributes that they use in setting policy prices.  In the decade following the period 
that we study, U.K. insurance companies have shifted their pricing practices to condition annuity premia 
on a buyer's postcode.  We speculate on what leads firms to forgo the use of some information in risk 
classification.   
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Asymmetric information is widely recognized as hindering the efficient operation of insurance 
markets, but whether it is present in specific markets remains a subject of active research.  Over the last 
decade, numerous studies have tested for asymmetric information in a variety of different insurance 
markets. This work has been largely based on the "positive correlation" test described by Chiappori and 
Salanie (2000).  This test rejects the null hypothesis of symmetric information when there is a positive 
correlation between insurance purchases and risk occurrence, conditional on the buyer characteristics that 
are used to set insurance prices.  
A limitation of the positive correlation test, noted by  Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and Chiappori 
et al. (2006), is that it breaks down when individuals have private information about characteristics other 
than risk type, such as risk preferences, and when these other characteristics affect insurance demand. 
Recent empirical evidence, reviewed by Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry (2008) and by Einav, 
Finkelstein, and Levin (2010), suggests that this type of preference heterogeneity plays an empirically 
important role in many insurance markets.  
This paper illustrates an alternative, and quite straightforward, test for asymmetric information that is 
robust to the existence of preference heterogeneity in insurance demand.  When some attributes of 
insurance buyers that are correlated with insurance demand and subsequent risk experience are not used 
to price insurance policies, then insurance buyers effectively have private information about their risk 
type.  This may occur even when insurance companies observe, or could observe, the relevant individual 
characteristics, but choose not to use them in pricing.  Asymmetrically used information that results from 
insurer choices has the same implications for market equilibrium and market efficiency as asymmetric 
information that results when features of the contracting environment make it impossible for the insurer to 
observe characteristics of the insured.  We test for asymmetrically used information by trying to identify 
individual characteristics that are risk-relevant and correlated with insurance demand, but that are not 
used by insurance companies in designing the contract menus facing individuals.  
Regulation can create information asymmetries in insurance markets.  When insurance companies are 
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prevented from using some individual characteristics in pricing insurance policies, buyers who know 
these characteristics and their relationship to risk type can exploit this information. In many insurance 
markets, however, asymmetrically used information occurs because insurance companies voluntarily 
choose not to price on the basis of risk-related buyer information that they collect, or could collect.  We 
explore this ostensible puzzle in more detail below.  We suggest that concerns about regulatory response 
and consumer backlash may contribute to this behavior, but we stop short of providing any evidence to 
support this conjecture.    
We illustrate the use of the unused observables test in the retirement annuity market in the United 
Kingdom, where those who save for retirement through tax-preferred savings vehicles – the equivalent of 
IRA’s or 401(k)’s in the United States – were, until 2011, required to purchase annuities.  Even when 
annuitization was compulsory, annuity buyers nevertheless had substantial flexibility with regard to their 
contract choice, and we test for whether asymmetric information appears to affect these choices. 
Understanding the nature of the information structure in retirement annuity markets is of substantial 
interest in its own right. Annuity markets have attracted increasing attention and interest in light of Social 
Security reform proposals in various countries to partly or fully replacing government-provided defined 
benefit, pay-as-you-go retirement systems with defined contribution systems in which individuals would 
accumulate assets in individual accounts. Whether the government should require individuals to annuitize 
some or all of their balance, and whether it should allow choice over the type of annuity product 
purchased, are two important policy design issues. The relative attractiveness of these various options 
depends critically on the information structure in the private market. 
We implement the unused observables test with a data set containing information on the annuity 
policies sold by a large U.K. insurance company.  During the time period we study, the company 
collected information on the annuitant’s place of residence but did not use this information to set prices.  
In this regard, the firm we study was following standard practice in the industry at the time.  We find that 
conditional on the insurance company’s risk classification, which is based on the annuitant’s age and 
gender, place of residence contains information about an annuitant’s socio-economic status that helps to 
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predict future mortality experience. Moreover, annuitants in higher socio-economic status residential 
locations purchase larger annuities.  These two findings lead us to conclude that place of residence is an 
unused observable variable that, when not used in annuity pricing, gives rise to a market that operates as 
though there was asymmetric information. 
In Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), we applied the positive correlation test in U.K. annuity market, 
using data from a different insurance company, and rejected the null of symmetric information 
Implementing the unused observables test in the same market serves several purposes. First, as we discuss 
in more detail below, the unused observables test is a more robust test of asymmetric information than the 
positive correlation test. Second, the unused observables test may offer some insight into the sources of 
private information about mortality risk.  In particular, it suggests that socio-economic status is a key 
source of mortality information that is not priced by insurance companies. Finally, our current analysis 
raises interesting questions concerning why insurance companies voluntarily forgo pricing on risk-
relevant observable characteristics. 
This paper is divided into six sections.  The first describes previous work on asymmetric information, 
in particular the widely-used positive correlation test.  The second section explains the unused 
observables test. We discuss its strengths and limitations relative to both the positive correlation testof 
Chiappori and Salanie (2000) and the cost curve test of Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010).  Section 
three summarizes the data set on annuity policies that we analyze.  Section four presents our key findings 
and discusses their interpretation. The fifth section discusses why insurance companies might voluntarily 
choose not to price on risk-relevant observable characteristics, and briefly describes more recent 
developments in the U.K annuity market that have resulted in widespread use of postcodes in annuity 
pricing.  We suspect that political economy concerns are likely to play an important role in company 
decisions. A brief conclusion considers the implications of our findings for equilibrium in other insurance 
markets.  
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1. Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: The Positive Correlation Test 
 
Cawley and Philipson (1999), Chiappori and Salanie (2000), and many others have observed that 
most of the classic models of equilibrium with either adverse selection or moral hazard predict that those 
who buy more insurance should be more likely to experience the insured risk.  With moral hazard, 
insurance coverage lowers the cost of the insured outcome and thus increases the expected loss.  With 
adverse selection, the insured knows more about risk type ex-ante than the insurance company does.  
Since the marginal utility of insurance at a given price is increasing in the risk of the insured event, those 
who know that they are high risk will select contracts with more insurance than those who know that they 
are low risk. 
This insight underlies the most common test for asymmetric information in insurance markets: the 
positive correlation test.  This test estimates the correlation between the amount of insurance an individual 
buys and his ex-post risk experience, conditional on the observable characteristics that are used in pricing 
insurance policies.  It is essential to condition on all the information that is used to set insurance prices.  
Finding, for example, that smokers demand more life insurance than non-smokers, and that they also have 
higher mortality risk, does not provide evidence of asymmetric information since the price of insurance 
for smokers is adjusted to reflect this differential.  Results from the positive correlation test as well as the 
unused observables test are always conditional on the risk classification that the insurance company 
assigns to the individual.   
The canonical positive correlation test involves estimating two reduced-form econometric models: 
one for insurance coverage (C) and the other for risk of loss (L).  For simplicity we present linear versions 
of both models.  The explanatory variables (X) in both equations are the set of variables that the insurance 
company uses to place the buyer into a risk class.  The estimating equations are:  
(1a) Ci = Xi * β + εi 
and 
(1b) Li = Xi * γ + μi. 
Under the null hypothesis of symmetric information, εi  and μi should be uncorrelated.  A statistically 
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significant positive correlation between the two rejects the null hypothesis and points to asymmetric 
information.  
Positive correlation tests have yielded a variety of findings in different insurance markets. Cohen and 
Siegelman (2010) provide a recent review of this literature.  In health insurance markets, the 
preponderance of evidence, reviewed for example by Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000), suggests a positive 
correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence, although there are important exceptions such 
as Cardon and Hendel (2001). In other health-related markets, however, the findings are less supportive.  
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) find a negative correlation between insurance coverage and risk 
occurrence in long-term care insurance, and Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) present a similar finding 
for Medigap insurance.  In the automobile insurance market, Chiappori and Salanie (2000), Dionne et al. 
(2001), and Chiappori et al. (2006) find that insurance coverage and risk occurrence are uncorrelated, 
while Cohen (2005) finds a positive correlation.   
A striking – and potentially revealing – difference emerges when the positive correlation test is 
applied in life insurance and annuity markets, two markets that insurance opposite mortality risks.   
In the life insurance market, Cawley and Philipson (1999) and McCarthy and Mitchell (2010) find no 
evidence of a positive correlation; those who buy life insurance are not higher mortality than those who 
do not. However, in the annuity market, Finkelstein and Poterba (2002, 2004) and McCarthy and Mitchell 
(2010) find a positive correlation between annuity demand and longevity. One possible explanation for 
these different findings is that insurance demand is determined not only by private information about risk 
type but also by heterogeneity in risk tolerance.  All else equal, more risk-averse individuals are likely to 
demand more annuity coverage and more life insurance.  Wealthier individuals might also demand more 
insurance of both types.  However, risk aversion and wealth are likely to be negatively correlated with the 
risk of dying early, and positively correlated with the risk of living a long time, since more risk averse and 
wealthier individuals may invest more in life-extending activities.  Cutler, Finkelstein and McGarry 
(2008) provide evidence consistent with this explanation. 
 Survival bias is another potential explanation for the absence of measured correlation.  He (2009) 
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revisits the Cawley and Philipson (1999) life insurance study but restricts attention to potential new life 
insurance buyers. She finds a positive correlation between life insurance and mortality, and argues that 
the difference between her results and those in earlier studies is that her analysis avoids survival bias.  She 
notes that those who have private information that they are high mortality buy life insurance but also have 
an elevated risk of early death, and are therefore under-represented in cross sectional samples.  This is an 
interesting insight that bears further exploration in other contexts. 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, when individuals have different tastes for insurance, the 
correlation between εi  and μi in equations (1a) and (1b) can no longer be attributed only to unobserved 
differences in risk of loss.  When individuals have private information about their risk type (Z1) and they 
also exhibit different degrees of risk aversion (Z2), the residuals from (1a) and (1b) can be written 
(2a) εi  =  Z1,i*π1 + Z2,i*π2 + ήi 
and 
(2b) μi  =  Z1,i*ρ1 + Z2,i*ρ2 +νi. 
The logic of the positive correlation test assumes that private information risk type (Z1) is positively 
correlated with both insurance coverage and the risk of loss (π1 > 0 and ρ1 > 0). If risk aversion (Z2)  is 
also positively correlated with coverage, but it is negatively correlated with risk of loss (π2 > 0 and ρ2 < 0) 
then the correlation between εi and μi  may be negative or zero. In this case, the positive correlation test 
would fail to reject the null hypothesis of symmetric information even in the presence of private 
information about risk type.    
This example illustrates how unobserved heterogeneity in individual preferences can lead to Type II 
errors in applications of the positive correlation test.  De Meza and Webb (2001), Jullien, Salanie, and 
Salanie (2007), Chiappori et al. (2006) and others develop equilibrium models that illustrate how 
preference-based selection may offset risk-based selection, making insurance coverage and risk 
occurrence uncorrelated or even negatively correlated (so-called “advantageous” or “propitious” 
selection).  Einav and Finkelstein (2011) illustrate graphically the nature of equilibrium with adverse and 
advantageous selection, illustrating how advantageous selection creates over-insurance relative to the 
 7 
efficient allocation, in contrast to the classic under-insurance created by adverse selection. 
Several recent empirical studies suggest the practical importance of preference heterogeneity in 
insurance markets. Davidoff and Welke’s (2005) analysis of the reverse annuity mortgage market, Fang, 
Keane and Silverman’s (2008) study of the Medigap market, and Finkelstein and McGarry’s (2006) study 
of the long-term care insurance market provide evidence that unobserved preferences for insurance are 
negatively correlated with unobserved risk type.  In contrast, Cohen and Einav’s (2007) study of auto 
insurance and Einav, Finkelstein and Schrimpf’s (2010) analysis of the U.K. annuity market suggest that 
unobserved preferences for contracts are positively correlated with risk-selection related demand, thus 
reinforcing the positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence created by private 
information about risk type.  
2. Testing for Asymmetric Information Using Unused Observables  
 
In a symmetric information environment, when it is costless for an insurance company to observe 
buyer attributes and condition the price of insurance policies on these attributes, insurance contracts 
should be conditioned on any buyer characteristics that are correlated with both demand for insurance 
coverage and risk of loss. Finding a buyer characteristic that is either unknown to or unused by the 
insurer, and that is correlated both with demand for insurance coverage and with ex-post risk of loss, 
implies that the insurance market operates as if there were asymmetric information.  The “as if” statement 
is important, because even if there are no technical barriers to the insurer observing some buyer attributes, 
if insurers do not condition policy prices on this information, the efficiency attributes of the market 
equilibrium will resemble those of a market in which sellers are prevented from observing buyer type.   
The unused observables test that we implement involves a straightforward search for observable 
buyer attributes that are both demand-related and correlated with risk of loss.  This test can be formalized 
using the foregoing notation in which X denotes the attributes that are used to assign a potential insurance 
buyer to a risk class, C denotes insurance coverage and L denotes risk of loss. W, a candidate unused 
observable variable, could be an element of either Z1 (risk type) or Z2 (risk preference).  The estimating 
equations for the unused observable test are: 
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(3a) Ci = Xi * β  + Wi * α + εi’ 
and 
(3b) Li = Xi * γ  + Wi * δ + μi’. 
Rejecting {α = 0, δ = 0} is tantamount to rejecting the null hypothesis of symmetric information, 
regardless of the signs of α and δ.  By investigating several candidate W variables, we can also learn 
something about the nature of private information in the insurance market.  
Implementation of the unused observables test requires individual data on insurance coverage, ex-post 
risk experience, the characteristics used by insurance companies in pricing insurance, and at least one 
individual characteristic that is not used in setting prices.  The positive correlation test requires the first 
three types of data, and the settings in which it has been applied often provide opportunities for collecting 
the fourth.  Household surveys, for example, have been used to implement the positive correlation test in 
various insurance markets.  Such surveys often include information on individual attributes such as 
wealth, parental health history, seat belt use, and occupation, most of which are not used to condition 
insurance prices.  These attributes vary in the extent to which they could be collected by the insurance 
company, and in the cost that would be involved in verifying the reports.  Proprietary data provided by 
insurance companies, the other type of data used in positive correlation tests, sometimes include data that 
companies have not used in pricing, and in some cases they may be supplemented with survey data that 
contain unused observables. For example, a policyholder’s address is almost always collected and kept in 
the data for billing purposes, but it is not always used in setting prices. In addition, the insurance company 
data may be supplemented with survey information. For example, Hemenway (1990) conducted an in-
person survey of seat belt use and insurance purchases among rental car drivers, and Ivaldi (1996) 
supplemented a French data set on automobile insurance with a survey of the insured’s smoking behavior.  
Neither variable is used in pricing the respective insurance products. 
 The unused observables test thus overcomes a limitation of the positive correlation test when 
there is unobserved preference heterogeneity.  An important drawback of the unused observables test, 
however, is that it is one-sided. Failure to find individual characteristics that are not used in pricing, but 
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that are correlated with risk of loss and insurance demand, may simply reflect a lack of sufficiently rich 
data, rather than the absence of asymmetric information.  Another limitation is that, like the positive 
correlation test, the unused observables test does not distinguish between adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  We discuss below how it is sometimes possible to use supplementary information to do so.  
The “cost curve” test for selection developed by Einav, Finkelstein and Cullen (2010) is robust to 
the presence of preference heterogeneity and it is unaffected by the presence, or absence, of moral hazard. 
However, it imposes a substantially higher data hurdle than either the positive correlation or the unused 
observables test. In particular, while all three tests require that the econometrician observe insurance 
coverage and ex-post claims (or other measures of expected costs) among individuals who are offered the 
same set of insurance contracts, the cost curve test also requires variation in the price of insurance 
coverage that is uncorrelated with insurance demand.  Einav and Finkelstein (2011) provide a graphical 
illustration of the relationship between these tests. 
3.  Place of Residence as an Unused Observable in the United Kingdom Annuity Market  
 We apply the unused observables test to the United Kingdom’s compulsory annuity market in the 
1990s.  Annuities pay a pre-specified payment stream to their beneficiaries, the annuitants, for as long as 
they are alive.  They provide a way of spreading an accumulated stock of resources over a lifetime of 
uncertain length and thus provide insurance against the risk of outliving one’s resources.  From the 
perspective of an insurance company, a high risk annuitant is one who has a strong chance of a long life.   
3.1 Insurance Company Data and Descriptive Statistics 
During our sample period, 1988 through 1998, retirees who had accumulated savings in tax-preferred 
retirement saving accounts in the United Kingdom were required to annuitize a large portion of their 
accumulated balance.  They could, however, choose among a number of annuity options that offered 
different amounts of insurance. There were no restrictions on the characteristics that U.K. insurance 
companies could use in pricing annuities in this market.  Ainslie (2000) reports that in the U.K. in the 
1990s, the vast majority of annuities, including all of the ones sold by the company that provided data for 
this study, were priced solely on the basis of the annuitant’s gender and age at the time of purchase.  This 
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is no longer the case, and the annuity market changed substantially during the most recent decade, as we 
explain below.  To apply the unused observables test for our sample period, we need data on the 
characteristics used in pricing -- gender and age -- as well as another characteristic that is related to both 
survival prospects and annuity demand.  
We obtained data from one of the largest U.K. annuity sellers.  These data were also used by Einav,  
Finkelstein and Schrimpf (2010) to analyze the welfare cost of asymmetric information in the U.K. 
annuity market.  The data set includes information on all of the company’s compulsory annuities that 
were in force in 1998 and that were sold between January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1998.  We observe 
the annuitant’s date of death if he died over the six-year period between January 1, 1998 and February 29, 
2004.  We also observe detailed information on the type of annuity purchased, and the three 
characteristics of the annuitant that are used in pricing the annuity: the date of purchase, the annuitant’s 
date of birth, and the annuitant’s gender.  Finally, we observe a characteristic not used in pricing: the 
individual’s post code, which indicates his place of residence.    
For analytical tractability, we restrict our sample in several ways.  We focus on the approximately 
sixty percent of the sample firm’s annuities that insure a single life. The mortality experience of the single 
life annuitant provides a convenient ex-post measure of risk type; measuring the risk type of a joint life 
policy which insures multiple lives is less straightforward.  We also restrict the sample to the 
approximately eighty percent of annuitants who hold only one annuity policy, thereby avoiding the 
complexity of modeling the total annuity stream for individuals who hold multiple policies.  We restrict 
attention to the approximately ninety percent of policies sold in England or Wales because we cannot map 
postcodes in Scotland into the same type of geographic unit that we can for England and Wales. Finally, 
we exclude annuitants who purchased annuities before age 50, and limit our sample to those who 
purchased annuities with guarantee periods of five or ten years.  These exclusions affect less than one 
percent of our sample. Our final sample consists of 52,824 annuitants.  
Table 1 presents summary information on our data sample.  The average age at annuity purchase is 
62, and 59 percent of the purchasers are male.  Our sample characteristics appear to match the 
 11 
characteristics of the broader market, described by Murthi et al. (1999), and of other individual firms in 
the market, such as the one studied in Finkelstein and Poterba (2004).   
3.2 Residential Location as an Unused Observable 
  Each postcode - which encompasses about forty people - lies wholly within a ward. A ward consists 
of about 9,000 residents.  Our sample includes annuitants from 49,123 unique postcodes and 8,941 unique 
wards, out of a possible 1.24 million postcodes and 9,527 wards in England and Wales.  We link the 
annuitant’s ward to ward-level data on socio-economic characteristics from the 1991 U.K. Census.  The 
public use version of the U.K. Census does not contain postcode-level data. 
Two measures of ward-level socio-economic status are available in the U.K census: educational 
attainment and occupation. Educational attainment is reported as the percent of the ward population aged 
18 and over that is “qualified,” which requires an educational credential above the level of the A-level 
standard, the equivalent of a good high school degree in the United States.  Table 2 provides summary 
statistics on educational attainment.  We report two sets of summary statistics, one weighting each ward 
by its population, and the other weighting each ward by the number of policies from that ward in our 
sample.  The average person in England and Wales comes from a ward in which about 13 percent of 
individuals are qualified. The average annuitant in our sample, however, comes from a ward in which 
about 16 percent of individuals are qualified. 
The ward-level census data also report the percent of employed people in each ward in different 
“social classes,” which are roughly occupational categories.  We compare three groups: professional and 
managerial (social classes I and II), skilled manual or non manual (social class III), and partly skilled or 
unskilled (social classes IV and V). Table 2 shows that the average person in England and Wales lives in 
a ward in which about 32 percent  of the employed individuals are in professional and managerial 
occupations, 44 percent  in skilled manual or non-manual occupations, and 22 percent  are in partly 
skilled or unskilled occupations.   A small "omitted" group is in the armed forces or in another setting that 
is difficult to classify.  The average annuitant in our sample is drawn from a higher social class ward than 
the average individual in the population. This is consistent with Banks and Emmerson’s (1999) findings 
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on annuitants in the U.K. Family Resources Survey.    
Census data provide a number of other measures of the attributes of each ward’s population.  One is a 
variable on the percent of persons in the ward having a “long-term illness, health problem, or handicap 
which limits his/her daily activities or the work he/she can do.”   The average person in England and 
Wales comes from a ward in which about 12 percent of the population reports having a long-term illness; 
our average annuitant lives in one in which about 11 percent of the population reports such illness.  We 
investigate whether this ward characteristic helps to predict annuitant survival, since it represents a 
variable that is not directly related to socio-economic status but that, if it is known by annuitants but not 
the insurance company, may provide annuitants with private information about their mortality prospects.   
Characteristics of the ward population convey some predictive information about the characteristics 
of a randomly drawn individual within the ward, but substantially less information than knowing the 
individual’s own characteristics. We calibrate the difference in information by computing the ratio of the 
variance of an average characteristic across wards to the variance of the characteristic in the population. 
This ratio is 0.11 for long-term illness, 0.23 for education qualification, 0.26 for an indicator variable for 
membership in social class I or II, 0.14 for an indicator for social class III, and 0.21 for an indicator for 
Social Class IV or V.  These ratios suggest that using ward-level means to proxy for an individual’s 
private information is likely to understate the actual degree of asymmetric information in insurance 
markets.  Our estimates of the informational value of the characteristics of an annuitant’s ward are also 
likely to understate the information potentially available to insurers, who observe postcodes rather than 
wards and could correspondingly have more detailed information on their insurance buyers, particularly if 
they invested in private information collection efforts that provided more finely graded data than are 
available in the public-use census.     
4.  Results of the Unused Observables Test in the U.K. Annuity Market 
We test whether the socio-economic characteristics of the annuitant’s ward help to predict the 
annuitant’s survival probability, conditional on the other characteristics that are used in annuity pricing, 
and then explore the analogous conditional relationship between socio-economic characteristics and 
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annuity demand.   
4.1 Geographic Location and Annuitant Survival Rates  
We begin by estimating a modified version of equation (3b), which assumes a linear relationship 
between risk of loss and the unused observable. In the annuity context, the “risk of loss” is the risk of 
survival; this is more appropriately estimated by a proportional hazard model of the length of time the 
annuitant lives after purchasing an annuity:   
(4) )()exp(),,,( 00 txxt ii λβλβλ ′=  
),,,( 0λβλ ixt denotes a hazard function for the probability that an annuitant with characteristics ix  dies t 
periods after 1998, conditional on living until t.  Following Cox (1972, 1975), we estimate a continuous-
time, semi-parametric, partial likelihood proportional hazard model. This allows us to estimate the 
β coefficients without making parametric assumptions about the form of the baseline hazard )(0 tλ .  The 
Cox model readily handles the left truncation and right censoring in our data. In our earlier study of 
another company’s annuitant data, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), we obtained very similar results using 
the Cox model and alternative models that allow for a discrete rather than continuous non-parametric 
baseline hazard as in Han and Hausman (1990).  The main covariates of interest are socio-economic 
status measures of the annuitant’s ward and the annuitant characteristics that are used in pricing.   
Table 3 presents our findings. The first column only includes covariates for the annuitant 
characteristics used in pricing.  The only coefficient shown is for the indicator variable identifying male 
annuitants; mortality hazards are higher for males. The other covariates, single year- and age-specific 
indicator variables, are not reported to conserve space.  The second and third columns add ward-level SES 
measures to the basic specification. Conditional on the characteristics that are used in pricing, the 
socioeconomic status of the annuitant’s ward is statistically significantly and positively correlated with 
annuitant survival. Column (2) indicates that annuitants from wards in which more individuals are 
educationally qualified have a statistically significantly lower mortality hazard. Column (3) indicates that 
those from wards with a greater proportion in managerial and professional occupations (social class I and 
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II) have a statistically significantly lower mortality hazard than both those in wards with a greater 
proportion in skilled occupations (social class III) and those in our reference category, partly skilled or 
unskilled occupations (social class IV and V). Finally, column (4) indicates that annuitants from wards in 
which a greater proportion of the population suffer from long-term illness have a statistically significantly 
higher mortality hazard. 
To illustrate the substantive importance of the findings in Table 3, we use the estimate of the baseline 
hazard and the hazard model coefficients to compute the implied impact of a change in ward 
characteristics on the 5-year annuitant mortality rate. Table 4 shows the results. We estimate, for example, 
that a 65 year old male annuitant who purchases a policy in 1994 in a ward with the average proportion of 
qualified individuals and survives until 1998 has a 10.7 percent chance of dying within the next five 
years.  The same individual from a ward in which the proportion educationally qualified is one standard 
deviation above the national average has only a 9.7 percent chance of dying. Similarly, a 65 year old male 
has only a 9.3 percent chance of dying if he is from a ward in which the fraction of the population from 
managerial and professional occupations is one standard deviation above average.   
Survival differences of this magnitude can affect the expected present discounted value of an annuity 
payout stream.  We illustrate this by computing how much annual annuity payments would change if 
insurance companies adjusted prices in an actuarially fair way to account for the relationship we find 
between ward-level socio-economic status and annuitant mortality.  Our calculation ignores any demand 
response to such price changes. The actuarially fair annual payment from an annuity depends on the 
characteristics of the annuity, the annuitant mortality table used, and the interest rate. We focus on a 
nominal annuity with no guaranteed payments.  Since we can only estimate mortality over a six year span 
using our data, for this illustrative calculation we use the annuitant mortality tables for the compulsory 
annuity market described in Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) for our baseline mortality hazard. We 
consider a 65 year old who purchases an annuity on January 1, 1998, and discount future annuity 
payments using the zero-coupon yield curve of nominal U.K. Treasury securities.  
The mortality differences associated with the coefficient estimates in Table 3 imply that if annuity 
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payments were adjusted in an actuarially fair manner based on the proportion of the ward that is 
educationally qualified, eleven percent of male 65 year old annuitants and four percent of 65-year-old 
female annuitants would experience a payout change of at least five percent.  If payments were adjusted 
based on the proportion of the ward in the managerial and professional class, about 17 percent of men and 
eight percent of women would experience a change in annuity payments of five percent of more.  
4.2 Place of Residence as Predictor of Product Selection  
The second component of the unused observables test requires examining whether annuitant ward 
characteristics are correlated with the amount of insurance purchased, conditional on the annuitant 
characteristics used in pricing. In the spirit of equation (3a), we relate insurance purchases and ward 
characteristics as follows:   
(5)  Ciw  = α*Xi + β*WARDw + εiw. 
In this equation, Ciw denotes the quantity of insurance purchased by annuitant i in ward w, and Xi denotes 
the annuitant characteristics that are used in pricing.  As before, Xi consists of indicator variables for 
annuitant’s gender, age at time of purchase, and year of annuity purchase.  Our coefficient of interest is β, 
which is related to the conditional correlation between a ward-level characteristic and insurance demand.    
Three elements of the annuity contract affect the effective quantity of insurance (Ciw). First, the 
insurance amount is increasing in the initial annual annuity payment. Second, the amount of insurance 
depends on the tilt of the annuity payment stream. Table 1 indicates that 90 percent of the annuities pay a 
constant nominal payment stream; the rest provide a payment stream that increases in nominal terms over 
time. For a given initial annuity payment, more “back loaded” annuities provide more insurance than 
annuities which pay a constant nominal amount each period.  Third, the amount of insurance is decreasing 
in the length of the guarantee period of an annuity. During the guarantee period, the insurance company 
will continue to make payments to the annuitant’s estate, even if the annuitant dies.  Guarantees therefore 
decrease the effective amount of insurance in the contract, since they turn mortality-contingent payments 
into certain payouts during the guarantee period. Annuitants are allowed to select guarantee periods of up 
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to 10 years. Table 1 indicates that about 82 percent of the annuitants choose guarantees, of which 89 
percent are five year guarantees. 
We follow two different strategies for measuring Ciw, the quantity of insurance in a particular annuity 
contract.  First, we stratify our sample of annuity contracts into sub-samples that vary on only one 
contract dimension, such as the amount of initial payout.  We can then look at the relationship between 
ward-level SES and the amount of insurance purchased along each dimension of insurance quantity.  
Specifically, we stratify the sample into constant nominal annuities with no guarantee, constant nominal 
annuities with 5-year guarantees and constant nominal annuities with 10-year guarantees. Within each of 
these three sub samples, we examine the relationship between ward-level SES and the quantity of 
insurance as measured by the log of the initial annual annuity payment. This transformation corrects for 
the skewness in the distribution of initial payments. This approach can only examine selection on one 
dimension of the contract at a time, while stratifying on other, potentially endogenous, dimensions.    
Our second approach addresses this difficulty by combining the different features of each annuity 
product into a single measure of insurance quantity.  A constant nominal annuity policy with a guarantee 
has both a bond component and an insurance component. We measure the insurance component by 
subtracting the present value of the bond component from the EPDV of the entire payment stream.    
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In this equation, A denotes the annual nominal annuity payment, St denotes the probability that the 
annuitant survives until period t, G denotes the number of years in the guarantee period, and ij denotes the 
expected nominal short-term interest rate at time period j. This insurance quantity measure is increasing in 
the amount of the initial payment and decreasing in the length of the guarantee. 
Evaluating (6) requires both a table of survival probabilities (St ) and a term structure for discounting 
future payments (ij). Following Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), we use the U.K. population cohort 
mortality table provided by the Government Actuaries’ Department to measure survival rates. This 
mortality table, which we condition on year of purchase, provides current and projected future mortality 
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rates by age and gender.  For the term structure of interest rates, we use data from the Bank of England on 
the zero-coupon yield curve of nominal U.K. Treasury securities on the first day of the month in which 
the annuity was purchased.  
Table 5 reports results from estimating equation (5) using both the stratified-sample approach and the 
insurance quantity metric approach described in equation (6) to measure the quantity of insurance Ciw..  
Because neither of the two approaches is well suited to accounting for differences in the degree of 
backloading of the annuity, we restrict the sample to the 90 percent of our sample policies that provide 
constant nominal payments. Our other results are robust to this sample restriction.  
The four columns in Table 5 report results for different approaches to defining the dependent 
variable, as indicated in the column headings. The three different panels report results using different 
ward-level characteristics as right hand side variables. The table thus presents results from twelve 
separate regressions.  Across all dependent variables (columns) and all ward-level measures (panels), the 
results suggest that individuals in wards of higher socio-economic status or better health are likely to 
purchase a greater quantity of annuity insurance. The only exception is the coefficient on the percentage 
of the ward in skilled occupations when the dependent variable is defined using the insurance quantity 
metric of equation (6); this is shown in Panel B, column 4.   
One concern with these results is that our sample of policies is left-truncated, since the annuitant must 
survive from the date of policy purchase until 1998.  While such left-truncation is easily handled in the 
hazard model analysis in Table 3, it may bias the linear regression analysis in Table 5. We therefore 
verified that our results are robust to limiting the sample to the subsample of policies, about 13 percent, 
sold in 1998.  The left truncation problem does not apply to those policies, and the basic findings for this 
subsample are similar to those for the full sample.    
While statistically significant, the magnitude of the relationship between ward-level characteristics 
and annuity quantity is modest.  A one-standard deviation, or 8.1 percentage point, increase in the 
proportion of the annuitant’s ward that is educationally qualified is associated with only a 0.13 to 0.22 
percent increase in amount of insurance purchased. Results using the other ward-level measures are 
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similarly small in magnitude.  Even if the substantive magnitude of the coefficients is modest, the 
qualitative finding that ward-level SES attributes are correlated with insurance demand, taken in 
conjunction with our earlier finding of a link between these characteristics and survival rates, constitutes a 
rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetric information.  
4.3 Interpretation 
 Our findings provide some information about the form of the private information in annuity 
markets.  The correlation between ward-level socio-economic status (SES) and annuity demand suggests 
that some of the asymmetric information is related to SES.  This may reflect “active” adverse selection as 
prospective annuity buyers recognize that their socio-economic status may affect their survival prospects.  
It could also reflect “passive” or “preference-based” selection if socio-economic status affects demand for 
insurance for reasons other than its effect on longevity risk, for example because it is correlated with risk 
aversion.  It is also possible that the findings reflect differences in the degree to which annuitization 
promotes investments in life-lengthening activities across different groups.  Regardless of which effect is 
operating, there are still adverse efficiency consequences from the asymmetric information. 
Our finding that the share of the annuitant’s ward reporting long-term illness is also related to the 
amount of insurance purchased seems to offer some support for traditional “active” selection, since long-
term illness is less likely to be a marker for preferences for insurance than for risk type. However, ward-
level health and socio-economic characteristics are highly correlated, which makes it difficult to 
determine the relative importance of these various selection factors.   
A related question is whether the positive correlation between annuity quantity and annuitant survival 
found in earlier studies can be explained by the unused observables we have identified, or whether other 
unobservable factors underlie selection.  We investigate this by replicating the previous positive 
correlation finding in the current data set.  Following Finkelstein and Poterba (2004), we estimate a 
proportional hazard model of length of time lived after purchasing an annuity, as in equation (4). The 
covariates of interest are the three annuity product characteristics that affect the quantity of insurance in 
the annuity contract: initial annual annuity payment, length of guarantee period, and degree of 
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backloading. We control for annuitant characteristics used in annuity pricing and for payment frequency.   
The first column of Table 6 presents the results of this replication exercise.  We find evidence of 
positive correlation: annuitants who purchase guaranteed policies, which offer less effective insurance 
than policies without guarantees, display higher mortality rates, i.e. are lower risk, than annuitants who do 
not purchase guarantees.  Those who choose larger initial annuity policies have a lower mortality risk, i.e. 
are higher risk.  There is a statistically insignificant finding that annuitants who purchase constant 
nominal annuities exhibit higher mortality rates than individuals who purchase more back-loaded ones.    
The remaining columns of Table 6 add controls for characteristics of the annuitant’s ward to the 
analysis in the first column. The results in columns (2) through (4) indicate that the addition of ward-level 
characteristics does not fully attenuate the positive correlation between dimensions of the insurance 
contract that provide additional coverage and ex-post risk type.  This suggests that there are additional 
unobserved annuitant characteristics that we have not measured that affect selection in this market.    
4.4 Moral Hazard vs. Selection  
 The unused observables test, like the positive correlation test, is a test for asymmetric 
information.  Without additional information, rejecting the null hypothesis of symmetric information does 
not offer evidence on the question of whether asymmetric information results from moral hazard or from 
selection.  In some cases, such additional information may be available.  For example, when a researcher 
has evidence suggesting that an unused observable variable is correlated with risk-of-loss even among 
individuals who have identical insurance coverage, then finding that individuals with certain values of the 
unused observable select more insurance coverage supports the presence of selection based on ex ante 
private information rather than of moral hazard based on ex post private information.  In contrast, the 
positive correlation test cannot distinguish between selection and moral hazard.  
 Since our empirical findings suggest that socioeconomic status (SES) is related to mortality risk 
and annuity demand, the central question concerns whether SES is correlated with mortality risk in the 
absence of interpersonal differences in insurance coverage.  If it is, then SES represents a source of ex 
ante private information for would-be annuity buyers.  A substantial body of evidence, surveyed by 
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Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney (2006), documents the positive relationship between SES and survival.  
Examples of studies that support this pattern are Attanasio and Hoynes (2000) and Menchik (1993) in the 
U.S. and Attanasio and Emmerson (2001) in the U.K.  
 Analysts differ on why SES is correlated with survival rates, but our reading of the available 
evidence suggests that differential annuity coverage is unlikely to be a primary factor. In the U.S., where 
the private annuity market is small and annuitized income comes predominantly from employer-provided 
defined benefit pension plans and the public Social Security system, Brown and Finkelstein (2008) show 
that a larger proportion of wealth is annuitized for lower than for higher SES individuals.  Annuity-
induced moral hazard effects would therefore operate to offset the observed positive correlation between 
survival rates and SES, rather than to reinforce it.  In the U.K., there is evidence that the positive 
relationship between SES and longevity also exists among pre-retirement individuals who are not 
receiving any annuitized payments. Data from the Office of National Statistics (1997) show that 
cumulative survival probabilities in the U.K. for men below age 55 are higher for men in higher social 
classes, even though men at these ages are not likely to be enrolled in any annuity-type schemes.  
 In light of this external evidence, we interpret our finding of a link between a ward’s socio-
economic characteristics and annuitant product choice as supporting the presence of selection. We do not 
rule out the potential presence of moral hazard as well.  Further work on the distinction between selection 
and moral hazard is a high priority, since the two have very different implications for public policy.   
5. Insurance Company Behavior and the Rise of  Postcode Pricing  
 Our empirical results suggest that U.K. insurance companies in the 1990s were not using all of 
the publicly available information that was related to mortality risk and annuity demand in pricing 
annuities.  This raises the interesting question of why these firms were not taking advantage of the 
opportunity to price on an observable risk factor.  Similar questions arise in many other insurance 
markets.  For example, for automobile insurance, Carter (2005) reports that, in the United States, most 
insurers use simple pricing formulae based on a driver’s age and place of residence.  In the French 
automobile insurance market, Ivaldi (1996) finds a difference between automobile accident rates for 
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smokers and non-smokers that is as large as the difference between men and women, yet insurance is not 
priced on the basis of smoking status. Brown and Finkelstein (2007) find that premiums in the U.S. long-
term care insurance market are constant across place and gender, even though these attributes predict 
substantial differences in expected nursing home utilization and cost.  
5.1  Profit-Maximizing Conditioning on Buyer Attributes 
In general, one would expect insurers to use a risk-related characteristic of the insured in pricing 
whenever the costs of collecting the information and differentiating policy prices on the basis of it is less 
than the incremental profitability of using the variable in differentiating prices.  Regulation may alter this 
calculus. In many U.S. states, for example, regulators restrict the characteristics that may be used in 
pricing automobile insurance.  In such cases, it is relatively uninteresting to test the null hypothesis of 
symmetric information.  The key question is the extent of asymmetric information created by such 
regulations and the magnitude of the associated efficiency effects.   
The more interesting cases, like those from the U.K. annuity market, the U.S. long-term care 
insurance market, and the French automobile insurance market,  involve information on individual 
characteristics that insurance companies could collect and use in setting prices, but that they choose not to 
use. The puzzle of unexploited information is particularly acute for variables such as gender and 
geography that are collected by default.  Although there may be some cost to processing this information 
and determining how to set characteristic-based prices, it seems unlikely that costs of information 
acquisition can explain the limited use of such data.   
We can offer four potential explanations -- there are surely others -- for why insurance companies 
choose not to use information that they collect, or could collect at low cost, in pricing insurance.  While a 
definitive explanation is beyond the scope of this paper, we discuss three possible factors that we regard 
as unlikely to explain the pattern, and then conclude by addressing political economy concerns that may 
be an important element of the explanation.   
First, insurance companies may choose not to use easily available, relevant information in pricing if 
such information is not quantitatively important in improving the prediction of loss outcomes.  While this 
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may explain why some buyer characteristics are not used in pricing, our estimates suggest that this 
explanation does not apply for annuities.  The association between ward-level SES and annuitant 
mortality is large enough to translate into non-trivial changes in payouts for a substantial fraction of 
annuity buyers.  Presumably the relationship between annuitant SES, a variable which is not currently 
measured but which could be collected, and annuitant mortality is even larger. There are large disparities 
based on non-priced attributes in other markets, too. For example, Brown and Finkelstein (2007) 
document that the unisex pricing of long-term care insurance generates gender-based effective load 
differentials valued at nearly half of the policy cost.   In this market, insurance companies appear to 
choose not to condition prices on individual attributes that could materially affect prices. 
Second, the predictive content of characteristics such as place of residence may be limited by the 
extent to which such characteristics are subject to change in response to characteristic-based pricing.  For 
a sufficiently large difference in the cost of an insurance policy across different locations, a potential 
buyer might seek to represent himself as resident in one location, when in fact he was elsewhere.   While 
this might explain why place of residence was not used in pricing annuities, since a buyer could establish 
a sham residence, it seems unlikely to be a general answer to the lack of characteristic-based pricing.  
There are some difficult to change attributes, such as educational attainment and gender, that appear to be 
correlated with the risk of loss in many insurance markets, but are not used in pricing. These attributes are 
also likely to be verifiable by the insurance company at modest cost.   
Third, using a previously-unexploited buyer characteristic for pricing may involve considerable up-
front investment to determine the appropriate pricing structure, and competitors may copy the pricing rule 
without incurring the initial costs.  These issues have been faced by U.K. insurers who have participated 
in the “impaired life” annuity market that has developed since the end of our sample period.   Cannon and 
Tonks (2011) describe the growth of this market.  Firms in this market offer substantial discounts to 
smokers and other individuals who are likely to be in poor health.  The initial pricing of these impaired 
life products involved both considerable investment in actuarial analysis and product development.  One 
of the developers of impaired life products analyzed a database of medical records from life insurance 
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sales around the world to try to predict the relationship between various medical conditions and annuitant 
mortality.  Another impaired life annuity seller contracted with one of the U.K. health authorities for their 
data on the mortality of individuals in nursing homes and hospitals and then devoted considerable 
resources to analyzing these data to derive relationships between mortality and health conditions. Even 
with these efforts, insurance executives we spoke with report that there was substantial uncertainty 
surrounding initial estimates of the prices at which impaired life annuities would break even.   
The firms that introduced impaired life annuities report concerns about pricing errors, but not about 
other firms free-riding on their pricing decisions without paying the costs of determining the appropriate 
pricing structure.  Insurance executives told us that one of the incentives to enter this market early was to 
build up statistical experience that can be used to refine subsequent pricing.  Early entrants gain an 
informational advantage relative to later-entering competitors, because new rivals can observe the new 
policy’s pricing structure but not the innovator’s sales practices and underwriting rules.  Potential 
imitators will not know the criteria that the initial entrant uses to deny coverage to some applicants, and 
this can be a key determinant of profitability.  Firms that emulate the innovator by introducing policies 
with similar pricing would likely attract some potential buyers who were denied policies by the innovator, 
and would therefore have a less attractive risk pool than that of the innovator. 
These discussions suggest that the risk of emulation is not a primary factor discouraging the use of 
additional information in insurance pricing, at least in the annuity market.  Nevertheless, changing 
practices at other insurers is likely to reduce the profitability of any policy pricing innovation.  If the 
innovator’s rivals ultimately adopt pricing rules that condition on the newly-exploited individual 
characteristics, the result may simply be an equilibrium in which all firms incur more up-front costs in 
pricing insurance policies.  The gain in profitability in such a setting may be much smaller than the gain 
to a monopoly insurer using new information in pricing.  
Finally, we consider the political economy issues surrounding the use of new individual 
characteristics for insurance pricing.  Introducing more refined pricing distinctions can have large public 
relations costs for individual firms and for the insurance industry and trigger regulatory changes to ban 
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the use of such information in pricing.  Insurance firms contemplating more refined pricing may be 
concerned about the direct costs of negative publicity, as well as by the prospect of triggering new 
regulatory initiatives in the largely unregulated annuity market.  Mohl (2005) illustrates the same adverse 
public reaction to proposals to use more variables describing a driver’s lifestyle in pricing automobile 
insurance in U.S. states. 
The behavior of large and small firms provides some support for these political economy concerns.  
Adverse publicity and fear of future regulation should have less impact on small firms or new entrants 
who do not internalize the costs of increased regulation or lost good will to the same extent that large 
existing firms do. Consistent with this, Ainslie (2000) reports that impaired life annuities were introduced 
to the U.K. market by new, start-up companies formed expressly for the purpose of offering the impaired 
annuity products to individuals in observably poor health. Incumbent firms did not follow suit, until, 
about five years after the introduction of these products, the impaired life market had grown to the point 
where the cream skimming of good risks by the impaired life companies created pressure on the existing 
companies to expand their pricing system.  By that point, the political economy costs of offering impaired 
life annuities had presumably declined as the public had become accustomed to such products. 
5.2  The Rise of Postcode Pricing 
While postcode pricing was not used during the sample period we consider, in the subsequent decade, 
it was introduced by a number of firms and has become widespread.  When firms initially proposed such 
pricing rules, in 2003, they faced negative public reaction, illustrated by newspaper stories on “Postcode 
Prejudice” (Sunday Times, July 13 2003), and “Postcode Peril” (Manchester Evening News July 7, 2003).  
Yet at least one firm chose to proceed in the fact of such public concern: in 2007, Legal and General 
adopted postcode-based payouts.  By offering higher payouts to those in relatively poor and unhealthy 
locations, the firm could potentially attract market share, while the higher mortality risk in these areas 
allowed it to still earn a profit on these higher-payout policies.  Within a few years, postcode pricing had 
become the norm, as other insurance firms saw that the consumer reaction to these products was in fact 
modest, and as competitive forces dictated matching the favorable payouts offered in some locations by 
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firms that used postcode information.  
U.K. insurance companies in many cases created several pricing categories to which postcodes were 
assigned.  Lander (2008), for example, reports that when Norwich Union, a large annuity provider, began 
to condition its annuity prices on a buyer's postcode, marital status, and tobacco use, smoking habits, it 
classified postcodes into nine distinct pricing bands.  Actuaries describing the shift to using postcodes 
noted that this evolution of the annuity market was natural, since other markets, such as those for auto and 
homeowner's insurance, already use location-based prices.   
Burrows (2010) illustrates the differences in the annual annuity payment to a 65-year-old man 
purchasing a £100,000 policy at the start of 2010.  A resident of London would receive payouts 4.28 
percent smaller than those of someone residing in Glasgow or Birmingham, cities with a higher 
population share in lower SES, and less healthy, categories.  Cities such as Bristol (2.14 percent) and 
Cardiff (3.04 percent) were also lower than Glasgow, but not by as much as London.   
One factor some commentators identified as facilitating the introduction of postcode-based prices, 
noted for example in Lander (2008), was the increasing availability of detailed data on health and 
mortality data files.  Insurance companies used such publicly-available data, along with their own policy 
experience, to determine prices for location-specific policies.  This suggests that the challenges of pricing 
based on observed attributes may be a potential barrier to the introduction of these products. 
As the U.K. annuity market has become more segmented since the time period of our analysis, with 
both enhanced annuities for those with medical conditions that might result in shorter-than-average life 
expectancy as well as postcode pricing, the choice set confronting potential annuity buyers has expanded.  
Cumbo (2012) reports on a study by MGM Advantage, a financial adviser, that compares annuity 
purchases by retirees who worked with a financial adviser and those who did not.  The former group was 
much more likely to purchase an enhanced annuity, which offers a higher payout.  For those without a 
financial adviser, MGM estimates that only two percent of retirees purchased an enhanced product, even 
though seventy percent of  those over 55 had a medical condition that would qualify them for such a 
product.  The differences between enhanced and standard annuities are substantially larger than those for 
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annuities sold to different postcodes.  For Cardiff in 2012, for example, Cumbo (2012) reports that a 
healthy annuitant would receive £6223 per year when buying a £100,000 policy, while a smoker would 
receive £7162, 15 percent more.  An annuity buyer with stage one cancer -- someone with localized 
cancer who had received treatment such as chemotherapy in the last six months -- would receive a payout 
of £7677, 23 percent higher than the healthy buyer.  These substantial payout disparities underscore the 
role that buyer-specific information can play in annuity pricing.   
The U.K.'s adoption of postcode pricing does not provide definitive evidence on the factors that lead 
insurance companies to alter the information set that they use for pricing, but it does offer some guidance.  
When the costs of processing and underwriting based on a given type of information decline, that 
information is more likely to be used.  It is more difficult to determine how firms assess the consumer and 
regulatory consequences of new pricing rules, since anything that creates greater heterogeneity in prices is 
likely to be criticized on distributional grounds.  This is an important topic for future analysis. 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper tests for asymmetric information in the U.K. annuity market by implementing an unused 
observables test involving the annuitant’s place of residence.  This variable was clearly observed by the 
company and by outside data analysts, but it was not used by insurance companies in pricing annuities in 
the 1990s.  It is used today, confirming our conclusion that it contained relevant information about future 
mortality risks.   
The unused observable test rejects the null of symmetric information if a characteristic of the 
individual that is not priced by the insurance company is correlated with both insurance coverage and risk 
occurrence.  This offers a more robust approach to testing for asymmetric information than the widely-
used positive correlation test. However, the test is one-sided: failure to detect asymmetric information 
using the unused observable test may simply reflect a lack of sufficiently rich data on potential unused 
observables,  rather than the absence of asymmetric information 
 We show that in the U.K annuity market, the socio-economic characteristics of an annuitant’s 
geographic location are correlated with both his survival probability and his average insurance purchase.  
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This provides evidence of asymmetric information in the market of the 1990s.  As postcodes have become 
a standard pricing variable more recently, the extent of such private information has declined.  Our 
findings provide some insight into the nature of individuals’ private information in the period we study, 
suggesting that at least part of their private information consisted of information about their socio-
economic status.    
Our findings have implications beyond the operation of annuity markets. There is no a priori reason to 
expect socio-economic selection to operate in the same direction in all insurance markets, and empirical 
evidence suggests that it does not.  In the annuity market, our findings suggest that socio-economic 
selection draws longer-lived, and therefore higher risk, individuals into the market.  It therefore reinforces 
any selection based directly on private information about risk type.  In the life insurance market, Banks 
and Tanner (1999) find that selection based on socio-economic status also appears to draw longer-lived 
individuals into the market.  Such individuals, however, are low-risk life insurance buyers. Socio-
economic selection may help more generally in explaining differences across insurance markets in the 
correlations between risk of loss and the quantity of insurance purchased. 
 A complete understanding of the limited use in pricing of available or collectible risk-related 
information on insurance buyers remains an open issue.  Our reading of the available evidence suggests 
that the political economy of insurance regulation may play an important role in determining the pricing 
function.   Studying the history of characteristic-based pricing of insurance policies, and the evolution of 
such pricing in various markets, may offer further insights into how insurance companies decide which 
variables to use in setting prices.  Comparing insuring prices in states with elected and appointed 
insurance commissioners, for example, might offer insights on the role of endogenous regulation in 
affecting pricing behavior.  These issues are left for future study.   
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Annuitant Population at Sample Firm 
Number of policies 52,824 
Number (%) of annuitants who die within sample period 5,592 (10.6%) 
Number  (%) of annuitants who are male 31,329 (59.3%) 
Average age at purchase 62.2 
Number  (%) of policies that are constant nominal payout 47,370 (89.7%) 
Number  (%) of policies that have guarantees 43,259 (81.9%) 
Mean initial payment (£) 1,819 
Median initial payment 901 
Standard deviation of initial payment (£) 3,682 
Average premium 19,550 
Note:  The sample consists of single life compulsory annuities sold between 1988 and 1998 that were still in force in 
1998.  The text describes further sample restrictions. Mortality experience covers the period January 1 1998 through 
February 29, 2004.  Policies that do not have constant nominal payouts have payouts that increase over time in 
nominal terms. Policies with guarantees continue to make payments to annuitant estate if the annuitant dies during 
the guarantee period. Premium and initial payment are converted to £1998 using annual values of the Retail Prices 
Index (RPI). 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics on Ward-Level Socio-Economic Status and Health Status   
 Population-weighted  Annuitant-weighted 
Social Economic Status Measure Average Std. Dev Average Std. Dev. 
Qualified 13.4% 8.00 15.9% 8.15 
Social Class: Professional and Managerial (I & II) 31.6 12.13 36.1 12.13 
Social Class: Skilled (III) 43.6 6.95 41.7 7.48 
Social Class: Partly Skilled or Unskilled (IV & V) 21.6 8.03 19.4 2.47 
Presence of Long-term illness 12.1 3.44 11.4 3.12 
Note:  Based on ward-level statistics from 1991 UK census. Population-weighted estimates are constructed 
weighting each ward by its population; annuitant-weighted estimates are constructed weighting each ward by the 
number of policies the sample firm has in that ward. The omitted social class, which consists of those in the armed 
forces, receiving annuity payments through government schemes, and “unknown,” accounts for 3 percent (2.8 
percent) of the population-weighted (annuitant-weighted) sample.   
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Table 3: Hazard Models Relating Annuitant Mortality Experience to Annuitant Gender and Ward-Level  
SES Characteristics 
  
(1) 
Education 
(2) 
Occupation 
(3) 
Illness 
(4) 
 
Male 
 
 
0.638*** 
(0.0349) 
 
 
0.629*** 
(0.0347) 
 
0.628***  
(0.0348) 
 
 
0.636*** 
(0.0347) 
Percentage of Ward that is Educationally 
Qualified  
 -0.0150*** 
(0.0017) 
  
 
Percentage of Ward in Professional or 
Managerial Occupations (Social Class I & II) 
    
 
 
-0.0118*** 
(0.0017) 
 
 
Percentage of Ward in Skilled Occupations 
(Social Class III) 
     
-0.0029  
(0.0027) 
 
 
Percentage of Ward with Long Term Illness 
      
 0.0248*** 
(0.0043) 
Note: Coefficients are from Cox Proportional Hazard Model of time lived since 1998 (see equation 4). N = 52,824. 
In addition to the covariates shown in the table, all regressions contain indicator variables for age at purchase and 
year of purchase. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the ward level are in parentheses. In column 
3, the omitted category is percentage of ward in partly skilled or unskilled occupations (Social Class IV or V). ***, 
**, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively.  
 
 
 
Table 4:  The Effect of Varying Ward Characteristics on Implied Five-Year Mortality Rates for 
Annuitants 
 Fraction of Ward Qualified Fraction of Ward in Social 
Class I or II 
Fraction of Ward with 
Long-Term Illness 
 Average One Std Dev 
Above Average  
Average One Std Dev 
Above Average 
Average One Std Dev 
Below Average 
Male 10.7 9.7 10.7 9.3 10.9 10.2 
Female 4.3 3.7 4.3 3.7 4.2 3.8 
Notes: Table reports the post-1998 5-year cumulative mortality probability of an individual who purchased an 
annuity at age 65 in 1994, conditional on having survived until 1998. Cumulative mortality probabilities are derived 
from the coefficient estimates in Table 3 and the corresponding estimate of the baseline hazard (not reported).  For 
the change in the proportion of the ward in Social Class I or II, the individuals are moved to Social Class IV or V.  
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 Table 5: Ward SES Characteristics and Quantity of Insurance Purchased  
 Dependent Variable: Log Initial Payment 
 
Dependent 
Variable: EPDV 
of Annuity 
Component of 
Policy 
 
[N=47,370] 
 Policies with 
No 
Guarantee 
 
[N=7,964] 
Policies with 
5-Year 
Guarantee 
 
[N=35,042] 
Policies with 
10-Year 
Guarantee 
 
[N=4,366] 
 
Panel A: Education measure of SES 
Percentage of Ward that is 
Educationally Qualified 
0.0223*** 
(0.0017) 
 
0.0271*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0160*** 
(0.0022) 
223.4*** 
(12.6) 
 
Panel B: Occupational Measure of SES  
Percentage of Ward in 
Professional or Managerial 
Occupation (Social Class I & II) 
 
0.0154*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0201*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0103*** 
(0.0022) 
136*** 
(9.6) 
Percentage of Ward in Skilled 
Occupations (Social Class III) 
 
-0.0012 
(0.0029) 
-0.0010 
(0.0020) 
-0.0054 
(0.0035) 
-49.2*** 
(16.4) 
 
Panel C: Health Measure 
Percentage of Ward with Long-
Term Illness 
-0.0373*** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0438*** 
(0.0029) 
-0.0284*** 
(0.0052) 
-330.1*** 
(25.3) 
 
Mean Dependent Variable 
(£1998) 
 
6.63 
 
6.30 
 
7.23 
 
8,842 
Note: The table reports OLS estimates of equation (5) on the sample of policies with constant nominal payouts.  
Different columns report results using different dependent variables; they are all measured in constant, 1998 £’s. 
Different panels report results using different ward characteristics on the right hand side. Each cell (defined by a 
column and a panel) reports a coefficient from a different regression.  In addition to the covariates shown in the 
table, all regressions include indicator variables for age and year of purchase and for gender of annuitant. In panel B, 
omitted category is partly or unskilled social class (Social Class IV or V). Standard errors, heteroscedasticity-robust 
and clustered at the ward level to allow for within-ward correlation in the error term, are shown in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels respectively.  
 
 35 
 
TABLE 6 –  Hazard Model Related Mortality to Annuity Policy Characteristics and Ward Characteristics  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male 0.630*** 
(0.0355) 
0.621*** 
(0.0354) 
0.628*** 
(0.0354) 
0.620*** 
(0.0355) 
 
Constant Nominal Indicator 0.047 
(0.049) 
0.048 
(0.049) 
0.045 
(0.049) 
0.050 
(0.049) 
 
Guarantee Indicator 0.083** 
(0.0391) 
0.076* 
(0.0400) 
0.079** 
(0.0400) 
0.076* 
(0.0400) 
 
Initial Payment (£1,000) -0.013*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.009 
(0.0058) 
 
-0.012** 
(0.0059) 
-0.009 
(0.0058) 
Percentage of Ward that is Educationally 
Qualified  
  -0.014*** 
(0.0018) 
  
 
Percentage of Ward with Long Term Illness 
    
0.024*** 
(0.0043) 
 
 
Social Class (Omitted Category = % of Ward in Partly or Unskilled Occupations) 
 
Percentage of Ward in Professional or 
Managerial Occupation (Social Class I & II)      
 
-0.011*** 
(0.0017) 
 
Percentage of Ward in Skilled Occupations 
(Social Class III)       
 
-0.003 
(0.0027) 
Note: Coefficients are from Cox Proportional Hazard Model of time lived since 1998 (see equation 4). N = 52,824.  
In addition to the covariates shown in the table, all regressions contain individual dummies for age at purchase and 
year of purchase (1988-1998) and frequency of annuity payments. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and are clustered at the ward level to allow for within-ward correlation in 
the error term. ***, **, * denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent level respectively. 
Reference category for “constant nominal indicator” is a more backloaded annuity. In column 4, the omitted 
category is Social Class IV & V (partially skilled or unskilled occupation).  
